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In 1997, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
the Mexican Secretariat of Health, and border health officials
began the development of the Border Infectious Disease Sur-
veillance (BIDS) project, a surveillance system for infectious
diseases along the U.S.-Mexico border. During a 3-year period,
a binational team implemented an active, sentinel surveillance
system for hepatitis and febrile exanthems at 13 clinical sites.
The network developed surveillance protocols, trained nine
surveillance coordinators, established serologic testing at four
Mexican border laboratories, and created agreements for data
sharing and notification of selected diseases and outbreaks.
BIDS facilitated investigations of dengue fever in Texas-
Tamaulipas and measles in California–Baja California. BIDS
demonstrates that a binational effort with local, state, and fed-
eral participation can create a regional surveillance system that
crosses an international border. Reducing administrative, infra-
structure, and political barriers to cross-border public health
collaboration will enhance the effectiveness of disease preven-
tion projects such as BIDS. 
he 2,000-mile U.S.-Mexico border is one of the world’s
busiest international boundaries. An estimated 320 million
people cross the northbound border legally every year (1). The
U.S.-Mexico border is a unique region where the geopolitical
boundary does not inhibit social and economic interactions nor
the transmission of infectious diseases among residents on
each side of the border. Some border cities (such as El Paso
and Ciudad Juarez) are separated by a short distance and serve
as one large metropolitan area for the local community (Figure
1). From an epidemiologic perspective, the border population
must be considered as one, rather than different populations on
two sides of a border; pathogens do not recognize the geopolit-
ical boundaries established by human beings. The border
region has a population of approximately 11 million people
(2), many of whom cross the border daily to work, shop, attend
school, seek medical care, or visit family and friends (3,4).
The border population also includes persons who pass tran-
siently through the region and others who come the area to
work in maquilas, the border factories. The region has experi-
enced tremendous population growth. During 1993–1997, the
U.S. border population grew by 1.8% annually, more than dou-
ble the national U.S. average of 0.8%, while the Mexican bor-
der population has grown by 4.3% per year, almost three times
the national Mexican annual growth rate of 1.6% (2,5). Popu-
lation growth has been spurred by increased economic oppor-
tunities after the North American Free Trade Agreement was
implemented in 1994. Currently, an estimated 3,300 maquilas,
employing >1 million workers, are located along the border
(6,7). The proliferation of border factories has  generated a
wave of internal migration of persons from other regions of
Mexico and Central America toward the border (8).
From Mexico’s perspective, the border encompasses some
of the country’s most economically prosperous states. In con-
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trast, the U.S. border region is among the poorest areas in the
United States, with >30% of families living at or below the
poverty level (8). Along the Texas border, an estimated
350,000 or more people live  in 1,450 unincorporated areas
known as colonias, which lack adequate sanitation infrastruc-
ture (8).
The large population movement, limited public health
infrastructure, and poor environmental conditions contribute to
increased incidence of certain infectious diseases (8–11) Anal-
ysis of data from the U.S. National Notifiable Diseases Sur-
veillance System for 1990 through 1998 showed increased
risks for certain foodborne, waterborne, and vaccine-prevent-
able diseases in U.S. counties within 100 kilometers of the
border, compared with nonborder states. These data show a
two- to fourfold greater incidence of hepatitis A, measles,
rubella, shigellosis, and rabies and an eightfold greater inci-
dence of brucellosis in border counties than in nonborder
states (11). Studies have identified the importance of cross-
border movement in the transmission of various diseases,
including hepatitis A (12,13), tuberculosis (14–18), shigellosis
(19), syphilis (20), Mycobacterium bovis infection (21), and
brucellosis (22,23). 
Despite the high prevalence of infectious diseases and
increasing movement of people across the borders, no surveil-
lance system had been established to assess the border popula-
tion as a geographic unit. Gaining an accurate picture of public
health needs was limited by the following factors. First, the
surveillance case definitions used for public health reporting in
Mexico and the United States are different. Also, laboratory
confirmation is often unavailable in the Mexican border states,
and therefore reported cases of infectious diseases are defined
primarily by clinical findings. In contrast, for the many notifi-
able diseases in the United States, laboratory confirmation is
required, and U.S. surveillance is heavily based on laboratory
reporting. This system likely underestimates the true incidence
rates. In the past, the two countries have exchanged limited
border surveillance data. However, these differences diminish
the usefulness of national surveillance data for developing a
comprehensive, regional understanding of infectious disease
epidemiology in the border areas. A consistent  binational per-
spective is essential to effectively control and prevent the
transmission of infectious diseases that move easily through
the geopolitical boundary. 
The Border Infectious Disease Surveillance (BIDS) project
was designed to bridge this surveillance gap by forming part-
nerships among institutions in both countries serving the
region and bringing together each country’s complementary
experiences in syndromic and laboratory-based surveillance.
This report describes the establishment of a binational surveil-
lance system for hepatitis and febrile exanthems along the
U.S.-Mexico border.
Project Mandate
In June 1997, the United States–Mexico Border Health
Association and the U.S. Council of State and Territorial Epi-
demiologists passed resolutions to support surveillance for
infectious diseases and emerging infectious diseases along the
U.S.-Mexico border (24,25). The Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) and the Mexican Secretariat of Health
spearheaded efforts to initiate the project and formalized an
agreement to establish BIDS through a memorandum of coop-
eration in epidemiology. A binational team of local, state, and
federal epidemiologists, laboratory scientists, and public
health officials met to organize and define project objectives.
Decisions were made by consensus among the participants.
Site Selection
The team selected four sister city groups that had previ-
ously collaborated on binational projects (Figure 2). Local and
state health departments identified one or more clinical facili-
ties in each city. The U.S. institutions are four primary-care
clinics and three tertiary care hospitals. The Mexican sites
comprise two general hospitals and four primary-care clinics.
The primary-care institutions service 10,000–20,000 acute-
care visits per site annually, while the hospitals service
23,000–51,000 acute-care visits per site annually.
Surveillance Strategy
After extensive discussions about local and national dis-
ease priorities, the team agreed on active sentinel surveillance
for hepatitis and febrile exanthem syndromes. A standard pro-
tocol of laboratory testing is performed for specimens from
patients who fulfill the clinical entry criteria (Table 1). Patients
with acute hepatitis are tested at local laboratories for hepatitis
A, B, and C. Depending on the initial results, specimens are
tested at CDC for hepatitis D and E, and confirmatory testing
for hepatitis C is performed. Patients with febrile exanthems
are tested locally for measles and rubella. If these tests are
negative, the specimens are tested at a state or national refer-
ence laboratory for rickettsiae, ehrlichiae, and, in selected
areas, Dengue virus (DENV).
Many diseases selected for BIDS surveillance have well-
defined preventive strategies, including vaccination. In Mex-
ico, measles is targeted for elimination, and rubella vaccina-
tion was incorporated into the national vaccination program in
1998 (26). In the United States., rubella outbreaks have
Figure 1. The Rio Grande River separates the border between Ciudad
Juarez, Chihuahua, Mexico, and El Paso, Texas, USA.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 1, January 2003 99
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occurred among Hispanic immigrants who were not previ-
ously immunized (27–30). The south Texas border also repre-
sents an important zone for transmission of DENV (31–33)
and typhus (34–36). In the United States, routine vaccination
for hepatitis A was recently recommended for children in most
of the U.S.-Mexico border region (37). Since laboratory con-
firmation was not readily available in Mexico, most acute hep-
atitis was assumed to be acute hepatitis A; however, the extent
of hepatitis B and hepatitis C infection was unknown. Syndro-
mic surveillance facilitated the monitoring of diseases targeted
for elimination as well as identification of emerging infectious
diseases, such as hepatitis E and ehrlichliosis, which have not
been previously well studied along the border. The selection of
these surveillance conditions was influenced by the need to
establish laboratory infrastructure in Mexico; the hepatitis and
febrile exanthem testing protocols involve serologic assays
with similar equipment and assay techniques. From the practi-
cal perspective, sentinel surveillance enabled clinics in several
border cities to participate at a reasonable cost. Active surveil-
lance was selected to enhance existing passive surveillance
activities in both countries, and, rather than creating a parallel
structure, all activities were integrated into state and national
reporting systems.
Organizational Structure, Personnel, and Training
The group formed an executive committee and three sub-
committees (epidemiology, laboratory, and communications).
Nine sentinel site surveillance coordinators, who report to a
local health department epidemiologist and a state-based epi-
demiologist, were hired and trained. The sentinel site coordi-
nators are responsible for interviewing patients, completing
data entry, and handling logistical issues such as specimen
shipping and tracking. Considerable training was provided for
border laboratory personnel. Only one of the Mexican border
laboratories had experience performing serologic testing for
hepatitis viruses, and none were experienced with testing for
measles or rubella viruses. Laboratory scientists from Instituto
de Diagnóstico y Referencias Epidemiológicas, Mexico City,
received training in testing methods for rickettsiae and ehrli-
chiae. 
Communications
Improving binational communication systems was critical
to project success. In addition to language and cultural barri-
ers, a large gap exists in communications infrastructure
between the United States and Mexico. Many Mexican local
and state health departments use combined telephone and fax
lines and have no Internet access; regularly scheduled confer-
ence calls are a principal mechanism for communication. Bor-
derwide meetings are held annually and sister city groups have
regional meetings. A binational team of epidemiologists, labo-
ratory scientists, and a representative from the El Paso Field
Office of the Pan American Health Organization conducts site
visits and evaluations. 
Logistics
The movement of equipment, supplies, specimens, and
financial resources between the two countries has been diffi-
cult and labor-intensive. Logistical issues include the chal-
lenges of moving laboratory equipment and supplies into
Mexico and specimens across the border into the United
States. Several U.S. and Mexican agencies regulate these
cross-border movements. Although regulations are established
at a federal level, they are often subject to local interpretation.
As a result, the BIDS participants work closely with local
agencies in their state. 
Information-Sharing Protocols and Binational Cases
In the past, sharing of surveillance data has been con-
strained due to differences in political systems, limited forums
in which to share information, and poor comparability of the
data. Two protocols were developed to improve information
sharing. The first describes the flow of information process in
each country. Although the Mexican health sector is currently
undergoing decentralization, officials from the federal Mexi-
can Secretariat of Health continue to play the major role in
reviewing, analyzing, and approving data before information
is shared with U.S. counterparts and CDC. In contrast, U.S.
local and state data can be shared without federal approval.
Figure 2. Border Infectious Disease Surveillance project  sentinel sites
in sister cities along U.S.-Mexico border: Tiajuana–San Diego,
Nogales-Nogales, Las Cruces–Ciudad Juarez–El Paso, and Reynosa-
McAllen. The new cities are Mexicali-Imperial (the sister city pair near
Tijuana–San Diego) and Brownsville (near McAllen).
Table 1. Entry criteria for active sentinel surveillance
Hepatitis  Illness with jaundice or dark urine, or illness >6 days without jaundice and >3 of the following: abdominal pain, 
acholic stools, nausea or vomiting, fever, anorexia
Febrile exanthem Fever and nonvesicular rash, or an illness >3 days with fever but no rash, cough, and diarrheaRESEARCH
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The second protocol establishes conditions for urgent notifica-
tion of sister city sites of outbreaks and cases of selected dis-
eases, such as measles. Urgent notification also occurs for
cases of binational public health importance, such as a case of
hepatitis A in a person who works as a food handler on either
side of the border. In the routine disease surveillance systems
of both the United States and Mexico, a reportable condition
diagnosed at a medical facility on one side of the border, in a
patient who lives on the opposite side of the border, may not
be included in routine disease reporting, and this information
is not usually provided to the neighboring health officials.
Data about these binational cases have not been traditionally
captured in either country’s reporting system. Therefore, bina-
tional case definitions were developed for BIDS participants
(Table 2). 
Outcomes
The project timeline is shown in Table 3. Data collection
began in late 1999, and data are currently being analyzed. As
of mid-2002, the network had identified 867 persons with hep-
atitis and hepatitis syndrome (369 in the United States and 498
in Mexico) and 421 persons with a febrile exanthem syndrome
(243 in the United States and 178 in Mexico). The project has
enhanced local reporting of these conditions. In 2000, BIDS
surveillance data from the sentinel site in Tijuana, Baja Cali-
fornia, identified 300% more cases of laboratory-confirmed
hepatitis A than would have been expected. All hepatitis A
cases identified at the San Diego site were binational and were
reported to the sister city health department in Tijuana. 
The BIDS network has prompted valuable data exchange
as well. In 2000, California and Baja California shared impor-
tant information about measles in California and rubella in
both states. The Baja California Health Department used BIDS
surveillance data to conduct epidemiologic follow-up and tar-
geted vaccination as part of their efforts to eliminate measles
and reduce rubella. In 1999, the Mexican Secretariat of Health,
CDC, and health officials from Texas and Tamaulipas con-
ducted the first binational investigation of an outbreak of den-
gue fever (38). 
Future Plans
Consolidation, evaluation, and expansion of BIDS will
take place in 2002–2003. The project, which began at 9 sites,
has expanded to 13 sites. Continuing efforts will focus on
incorporating six new clinical sites and three new border cities
(Figure 2). With sufficient expansion, BIDS may be able to
calculate population-based incidence rates for selected infec-
tious diseases in some border areas. However, BIDS will con-
tinue to deal with the complexities of conducting surveillance
among mobile populations and obtaining accurate denomina-
tor information for the border region. 
Although activities focused initially on hepatitis and
febrile exanthems, the project is sufficiently flexible to incor-
porate other syndromes and diseases, including West Nile virus
and infectious agents that could be used in bioterrorism events.
BIDS continues to improve communications systems and sup-
port mechanisms for information exchange.
Conclusions
The BIDS project demonstrates that the development of a
binational regional surveillance system for one of the world’s
busiest geographic boundaries is feasible. Success is highly
dependent on extensive U.S. and Mexican local and state
involvement; maintaining a balance among the competing pri-
orities of this diverse group of participants continues to be one
of the project's greatest challenges. A high level of participa-
tion among the group is an essential ingredient in creating a
binational, locally-relevant agenda and enhancing long-term
project sustainability. The BIDS surveillance system has
required flexibility to incorporate local and state reporting
requirements, while maintaining sufficient standardization of
case definitions, data, and laboratory testing procedures. Dedi-
cated coordination at the federal level of both countries has
been essential. Maintaining federal political commitment and
funding for the 3-year development and implementation
period has been and continues to be critical. 
BIDS promotes communication and cooperation through
border-wide meetings and the binational subcommittees. The
border sister city meetings provide a forum for exchange of
ideas and discussion of issues of binational importance, thus
strengthening cross-border relationships among counterpart
epidemiologists and laboratory staff. Many logistical problems
require local solutions best handled by the sister cities working
together. Effective problem solving requires coordination and
optimal communication among participants. However, this
level of effectiveness will not be achieved in the border region
until the infrastructure barriers are overcome, including sub-
stantial improvements in access to telephones, fax machines,
computers, the Internet, and satellite teleconferencing.
BIDS continues to face major obstacles in the movement
of equipment, supplies, specimens, and financial resources
Table 2. Case criteria for a binational case of hepatitis or a febrile 
exanthem
Binational case (at least one of the following):
Person with hepatitis or febrile exanthem who traveled or lived in neighbor-
ing country during incubation period for suspected or confirmed disease.
Person with hepatitis or febrile exanthem who had contact with persons who 
traveled or lived in neighboring country during incubation period for sus-
pected or confirmed disease.
Case for which binational cooperation is needed for case investigation, case 
management, or both.
Table 3. Timeline for implementation of Border Infectious Disease 
Surveillance project
1997 Mandate and objectives, site selection
1998 Binational planning, surveillance protocol with case definitions 
and data collection instruments
1999 Laboratory protocols and infrastructure; epidemiology training
2000–2001 Pilot data collection
2002–2003 Evaluation, consolidation, site expansionEmerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 9, No. 1, January 2003 101
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across borders. These activities are cumbersome and time con-
suming for all project participants. Accords between the
United States and Mexico should be developed to promote
cooperation in public health and facilitate sharing of human
and other resources and the moving of laboratory specimens
across the border; these agreements would substantially
enhance border health activities and benefit both countries.
The states of Arizona and Sonora cooperated successfully in
establishing a shared border health facility in Nogales, Sonora.
This state-based model could be replicated in other areas of the
border and reinforced with federal policies. To further enhance
federal support, we suggest that a joint border field station be
established by CDC, the Mexican General Directorate of Epi-
demiology, and the Instituto de Diagnóstico y Referencias Epi-
demiológicas. 
The mandates from the United States–Mexico Border
Health Association and the Council of State and Territorial
Epidemiologists served as an initiation point for project activi-
ties but did not anticipate the need for additional federal-level
agreements for data exchange. The BIDS group has drafted
guidelines for conducting a binational outbreak investigation
and will be implementing these as opportunities arise. Ongo-
ing data collection will enable better characterization of bina-
tional cases. However, formal agreements at high levels of
government are needed to authorize and endorse the timely
binational exchange of epidemiologic and laboratory informa-
tion about important infectious disease outbreaks and cases
that occur along the border at BIDS sites and sites that are not
currently part of the BIDS network. 
Political changes at the local, state, and federal levels in
Mexico frequently lead to changes in public health personnel,
resulting in an ongoing need to train and incorporate new per-
sonnel into the project; this reality has highlighted the impor-
tance of institutionalizing any binational project through high-
level formal agreements between the two countries. Weather-
ing political changes is a challenge to infrastructure-building
projects, like BIDS, which require several years of investment
until tangible results, such as data are available.
To achieve the goal of building border epidemiology and
laboratory capacity, BIDS established a system that built on
existing strengths in syndromic and laboratory surveillance.
The enhancement of border laboratory infrastructure at the
Mexican sites was a major benefit. Additional support is
essential, including stable funding for laboratory supplies and
training courses, ranging from laboratory techniques to pre-
ventive maintenance of laboratory equipment; implementation
of standardized quality control and quality assurance guide-
lines, such as a voluntary blinded proficiency testing program
for selected tests; and a telephone consultation service with a
toll-free telephone number to help staff address the problems. 
Syndromic surveillance for hepatitis and febrile exanthems
will allow us to estimate the magnitude of public health prob-
lems along the border, for example, acute hepatitis B and hep-
atitis C; determine the geographic distribution of diseases,
such as typhus, ehrlichiosis, and dengue; detect outbreaks;
evaluate control measures, such as immunization efforts to
prevent measles, rubella, and hepatitis A and the reduction of
breeding sites for mosquitoes that transmit dengue; and moni-
tor emerging infections, such as hepatitis E, and generate
hypotheses about these diseases that can be further studied.
Systematic collection of surveillance data on binational cases
will also better define the contribution of mobile populations
to disease transmission.
As a model for true binational cooperation along the bor-
der, BIDS is a starting point from which a comprehensive
infrastructure can be developed to accurately assess the health
status of border residents and other migrants who come
through the area. Ultimately, data provided by BIDS will be
useful in the development of more effective prevention and
control strategies for infectious diseases in this unique region. 
Dr. Weinberg is a medical epidemiologist in the Division of Glo-
bal Migration and Quarantine, Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention. Her research interests focus on the epidemiology and
prevention of infectious diseases along the U.S.-Mexico border.
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